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I. Abstract  
  An ongoing debate among propositionalists centers on the 
question: can the truth values of propositions change over time ? The view 
that says that propositions can change truth values over time has been 
called temporalism. The more traditional view of propositions, which 
denies temporalism, and goes back to Frege, has been called eternalism. 
Mark Richard1 has given forceful argument against temporalism and in 
favor of eternalism: the argument from belief retention. On Richard’s 
view, if temporalism comes out true then it is impossible for one to retain 
one’s beliefs over time.  
 As an eternalist about propositions, I believe that all propositions 
in some way refer to a particular time. In this paper, I will examine 
Richard’s argument from belief retention and some temporalist responses 
to it. Afterwards, I will introduce my own eternalist account of 
propositions which will i) allow for belief retention in the precisely the 
troublesome cases which form the basis of Richard’s original argument 
contra temporalism ii) account for the temporalist intuition that some 
propositions contain no implicit time references.  
                                                 
1 M. Richard, “Temporalism and Eternalism”, Philosophical Studies 39 
(1981); pp 1-13 




1. Introduction  
 
 This thesis explores, in part, the ontology of propositions. 
Propositions are understood as the (abstract) shareable objects of belief, 
meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truth-values. Consider for example 
the following pair of sentences:  
 (1a) Die Kuh sprang über den Mond.  
 (1b) The cow jumped over the moon.  
Here (1a) translates (1b). They share the same semantic content. The 
propositionalist (i.e. the realist about propositions) will argue that if (1a) is 
able to precisely translate (1b) it must be the case that both (1a) and (1b) 
share some characteristic content. That content just is the proposition that 
this sentence-pair expresses. It is important to note that the shared content 
in this case cannot be any part of the sentences themselves since, strictly 
speaking, the sentence-pair share no content (i.e. none of their constituents 
are the precisely same).  
 Likewise when two or more individuals believe that p (where p is 
any proposition at all), the ‘that p’ constituent of their belief shares some 
characteristic content which just is the proposition they both believe. As in 
the following case:  
 (1c) Matthew believes that the dish ran away with the spoon.  
 (1d) Sarah believes that the dish ran away with the spoon.  
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Here, Matthew and Sarah share roughly the same belief: ‘that p,’ where p 
stands for ‘the dish ran away with the spoon.’ Suppose that Matthew and 
Sarah are conversing about the dish and spoon and why they have just ran 
away. If their beliefs were not the same, confusion would ensue as it 
would then be impossible to truly attribute any belief to any individual. In 
this case, if the belief states ascribed in (1c) and (1d) did not share some 
characteristic content, then it could be the case that when Matthew 
believes ‘that the dish ran away with the spoon’ he believes that ‘the the 
dish ran away with the spoon’ but when Sarah believes ‘that the dish ran 
away with the spoon,’ she believes that ‘President Bush is incompotent’. 
In such a case, while Matthew and Sarah would seem to be talking to each 
other about their shared beliefs, they would in fact be talking about totally 
different beliefs. This outcome would be intolerable. Gladly, it is not the 
situation we find ourselves in.  
 Another argument for propositions has been suggested by Matthew 
McGrath, this is the “Metaphysics 101” argument.2 We begin by noting 
that there is a difference between the act and content of a belief. Thus, 
even while others cannot share in my belief- act, they can share the 
content of my belief. For example, suppose I believe that (H) Headaches 
are painful. What I believe, when I believe (H), is something that others 
                                                 
2 McGrath, Matthew, "Propositions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/propositions/>.  
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also believe. We all believe headaches are painful. So the content of my 
belief ‘that (H)’ is shareable. Furthermore, suppose I believe  
  (H`) Headaches are caused by tiny Nazi robots. 
 (H`) is clearly false, where (H) is clearly true. Thus (H) and (H`) are 
carriers of truth values. So there are beliefs whose contents are shareable, 
and carriers of truth values. Thus there are propositions, which just are the 
shareable objects of belief, meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truth-
values.  
 Propositions, so conceived, are handy things to have in one’s 
ontology. They allow one a straightforward way to explain and analyze 
what it is that sentences and beliefs and utterances share when they 
express some characteristic bit of content, and they offer us a way of 
determining the truth value of a sentence, belief, or utterance independent 
of any concerns about linguistic mud in the water. Even so, one could no 
doubt develop an alternative, i.e. non-propositional, account for the shared 
content of sentences, utterances, and propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs, 
fears, hopes) as Putnam and Quine have. However, insofar as I intend to 
explore the nature of propositions, in this paper we will proceed (pace 
Putnam and Quine) as though we were certain of their existence. An 
ongoing debate among propositionalists centers on the question: can the 
truth values of propositions change over time. The view that says that 
propositions can change truth values over time has been called 
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temporalism. The more traditional view of propositions, which denies 
temporalism, and goes back to Frege, has been called eternalism. Mark 
Richard3 has given forceful argument against temporalism and in favor of 
eternalism: the argument from belief retention. On Richard’s view, if 
temporalism comes out true then it is impossible for one to retain one’s 
beliefs over time.  
 As an eternalist about propositions, I believe that all propositions 
in some way refer to a particular time. In this paper, I will examine 
Richard’s argument from belief retention and some temporalist responses 
to it. Afterwards, I will introduce my own eternalist account of 
propositions which will i) allow for belief retention in the precisely the 
troublesome cases which form the basis of Richard’s original argument 
contra temporalism ii) account for the temporalist intuition that some 
propositions contain no implicit time references.  
  2. Eternalism, Temporalism, and truth-values  
 Some sentences, such as ‘it was raining in St. Louis on July 1, 
2005’ express propositions that make direct references to times. Following 
Richard4, we will call the propositions expressed by such sentences 
‘eternal propositions.’ In order to evaluate the truth-values of such 
sentences we must have to look at the time being referred to and determine 
                                                 
3 M. Richard, “Temporalism and Eternalism”, Philosophical Studies 39 
(1981); pp 1-13 
4 Mark Richard, ‘Tense, Propositions, And Meanings’ Philosophical 
Studies (1981: 337-351)  
 Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 7 
  
whether, at that time, the proposition expressed by the sentence comes out 
true. So for example the proposition expressed by  
 (2) It was raining in St. Louis on July 1, 2005  
will come out true iff it is the case that it was raining in St. Louis on July 
1, 2005. Following Frege, eternalists consider (2) a complete proposition, 
or thought, because it contains an object, a property, and an explicit 
reference to a particular time.  
 Other sentences, on the Fregean view, are incomplete expressions 
of complete propositions. For instance  
 (3) Nora is sleeping  
Here no explicit reference to a time is made. It is natural to suppose that 
‘is’ in (3) is temporal weighted and points to the present time or the time 
of utterance of (3). We should resist this supposition. It is also possible to 
read ‘is’ as a present progressive verb which picks out no one particular 
time. As we go forward it will help to keep this reading of ‘is’ in mind. 
Following Richard, then, we will call the propositions expressed by such 
sentences ‘temporal propositions.’ These differ from eternal proposition 
only insofar as they do not make direct references to times. Eternalists 
such as Frege, Richard, and G.W. Fitch (1998) contend that temporal 
propositions do not exist at all. They argue that temporal propositions 
actually express eternal propositions, they merely do so incompletely. In 
other words, for the eternalist, all propositions are eternal propositions 
 Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 8 
  
which contain (either explicit or implicit) references to times. Thus even 
(3) which seems to contain no such reference expresses an eternal 
proposition. The temporalist argues to the contrary that propositions like 
the one expressed by (3) can be non-time specific. Notice that if we try to 
use the same sort of truth conditions for (3) as we did for (2) (i.e. if we try 
to use the same truth conditions for both eternal and temporal 
propositions) the outcome will be indeterminate. On these conditions (3) is 
true (3*) iff it is the case that ‘Nora is sleeping’ is true at t. But because 
(3) makes no explicit reference to a time (3*) is infeasible as the truth 
conditions for (3). But, according to Frege, (3) actually does make an 
implicit reference to a particular time: the time of utterance.5 So that if I 
utter (3) at 4 the in afternoon on a workday it will come out false; if I utter 
(3) at 3 in morning on a workday it will come out true, and so on. As 
Frege remarks,  
[A]re there thoughts which are true today but false in six months 
time? The thought, for example, that the tree is covered with green 
leaves, will surely be false in six months time. No, for it is not the 
same thought at all. The words ‘this tree is covered with green 
leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves for the utterance; the time 
                                                 
5 To avoid confusion, we should note that ‘utterance’ here is a technical 
term in Fregean semantics and that it should not be read as synonymous 
with utterance. Frege is not attempting to give us an utterance-semantics. 
Instead, I suggest that we take the construction ‘time of utterance’ to be 
roughly synonymous with a Kaplanian ‘context’ which I discuss below.  
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of utterance is involved as well. Without the time-indication this 
gives we have no complete thought, i.e. no thought at all. Only a 
sentence supplemented by a time indication and complete in every 
respect expresses a thought. But this, if it is true, is true not only 
today or tomorrow but timelessly (1968: 533). 
 Note that when Frege says that sentences such as ‘this tree is covered with 
green leaves’ (and (3)) express no thought at all, he does not mean that no 
content is transmitted by them. On the contrary, he simply means that no 
content is transmitted by them until the implicit time reference is 
appended. So, when I say ‘Nora is sleeping,’ it is immediately understood 
that I am really saying ‘Nora is sleeping now.’ Where now is taken as an 
indexical pointing to a precise temporal location (e.g. July 1, 2006 10:34 
pm CST). This all carries over for temporally unspecific sentences 
attributing beliefs to individuals as well. Such sentences are incomplete 
expressions of their constituent propositions; in other words they require 
the addition of a time-reference in order to be complete (and to carry truth-
values), so that  
 (4) Eric believed that Nora was sleeping  
must be supplemented by a time reference such as,  
 (4*) Eric believed that Nora was sleeping at t. So, ordinary 
propositions and belief attribution propositions must likewise refer to the 
‘time of utterance’ in order to be complete (and to have a determinate 
 Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 10 
  
truth-value) on the Fregean (eternalist) view. As a consequence, suppose 
that Eric asserts (3) exactly four times in his life. On eternalism, each of 
Eric’s assertions expresses a different eternal proposition. Such that he is 
regarded as asserting  
 At t1… (E1) Nora is sleeping at t1 
 At t2… (E2) Nora is sleeping at t2 
At t3… (E3) Nora is sleeping at t3  
At t4… (E4) Nora is sleeping at t4  
On this view, the proposition (or content) expressed by sentence (3) varies 
with each instance (E1) – (E4) at which it is asserted. Furthermore, the 
truth-value of each proposition (E1) – (E4) is invariant. Thus, eternalism is 
said to consist of the view that all temporally unspecific propositions are 
content variant and truth invariant.6 In other words, all such propositions 
have precisely fixed truth-values and differing content at every time at 
which they are uttered  
 To sum up, on eternalism, all propositions include, implicitly, 
particular times. All the eternalist does to determine the truth of (E1) – 
(E4) is look at the world in question and check whether (3) is true at that 
world at the time in question. For the eternalist, world + proposition ⇒ 
truth-value.  
                                                 
6 See Mark Aronszajn (1996: 74) and Brogaard (2006 forthcoming)  
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  But the temporalist cannot appeal to implicit time references to 
determine the truth-values of such propositions as expressed by (3) and 
(4). On the temporalist reading (3) and (4) express temporal propositions 
and as such they make no references at all to times. We must arrive at their 
truth values by different means. In the next section, we will examine the 
temporalist method for determining the truth-values for incomplete 
sentences and belief attributions.  
 The first thing to point out is that, in the foregoing discussion of 
eternalism, we have treated sentences such as  
 (3) Nora is sleeping 
 as incomplete sentences expressing eternal propositions. This 
characterization is correct on eternalist grounds because all propositions 
contain references to times. On temporalism, however (3) expresses a 
temporal proposition whose truth will depend upon the context in which 
(3) is uttered. On a standard semantic theory, such as that of David 
Kaplan7 a context is a set of parameters including a speaker, an addressee, 
a world, a time, and a location. For example the set {Eric, Jon, the actual 
world, 19:00 CST July 3 2006, St. Louis} is a context. There are two 
things we should note about contexts. 1) Contexts are not to be understood 
as mere ‘settings’ of utterances as we might be prone to think. Rather, 
                                                 
7 Kaplan, David. "Demonstratives." in Almog, Perry, and Wettstein 
Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 481-
563. 
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contexts in the present sense are technical entities. They need not relate to 
any real world setting. 2) Not everyone agrees with Kaplan’s notion of 
contexts. David Lewis argues that “no two contexts differ by only one 
feature. Shift one feature only and the result of the shift is not a context at 
all.”8 But for our purposes I will work within Kaplan’s framework of 
contexts.  
 Returning to our example then, Eric says  
  (3) Nora is sleeping 
 and the temporalist wants to determine the truth-value of Eric’s utterance. 
She proceeds by examining the utterance in light of the set of parameters 
given above. She sees that (3) is uttered by Eric, to Jon, at the actual 
world, at 19:00 CST, July 3, 2006, in St Louis. She then checks to see 
whether Nora was in fact sleeping at the actual world in the same temporal 
location. If so then this temporal proposition is true, if not then it is false. 
Suppose, as above, that Eric asserts (3) exactly four times in his life. On 
temporalism, each of Eric’s assertions expresses the same temporal 
proposition, such that Eric would be regarded as saying  
 At t1… (E1) Nora is sleeping  
At t2… (E2) Nora is sleeping 
At t3… (E3) Nora is sleeping  
At t4… (E4) Nora is sleeping  
                                                 
8 David Lewis (1998: 29) 
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On this view, the proposition (or content) expressed by sentence (3) is 
invariant at each instance (E1) – (E4) at which it is asserted. Furthermore, 
the truth-value of each proposition (E1) – (E4) could vary depending on 
the context in which it is asserted. Thus, temporalism can be said to 
consist of the view that all propositions are content invariant and truth 
variant.9  
 On temporalism, then, temporal propositions (those which contain 
no implicit references to times) must be evaluated using the notion of 
semantic contexts (which do include times). For the temporalist, context 
<speaker, hearer, world, time, location,> + proposition ⇒truth-value.  
 Having said that, we should keep in mind that the temporalist does 
not deny that there are some eternal propositions. For such propositions, 
the temporalist simply shifts her context, omitting the time parameter, 
which is now supplied by the proposition itself. Thus temporalism is more 
flexible than eternalism. It allows for more than one denomination of 
proposition.  
3. Richard’s argument against temporalism  
 In ‘Temporalism and Eternalism’ Mark Richard gives what many 
philosophers consider to be a decisive argument against temporalism. 
According to Richard the temporalist is unable to give an adequate 
account of belief retention.  
                                                 
9 See Mark Aronszajn (1996: 74) and Berit Brogaard (2006 forthcoming)  
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 Richard begins by asking us to consider the following reasoning: 
(MARY)  
  [1] Mary believed that Nixon was president  
 [2] Mary still believes everything she once believed  
  ______________________________________  
 [3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president10 As 
Richard notes, ‘this argument is not a valid argument in English.’ As we 
use these types of sentences in English, [3] does not at all follow from [1] 
& [2]. Or as Nathan Salmon puts it, ‘such an inference is an insult not only 
to Mary but also to the logic of English as it is normally spoken.’11 Thus, 
on pain of irrationality we ought to reject any view on which one could 
reasonably conclude that MARY contains a valid inference. Unfortunately 
for the temporalist, according to Richard, she is committed to the validity 
of MARY. In light of this commitment, the argument goes, temporalism 
ought to be rejected. The trouble here is that the conclusion shifts Mary’s 
true belief that Nixon is president into the present time, and at the present 
time, the belief is clearly false. But there seems to be no reason for it to be 
false. If temporalism is true, and propositions contain no implicit times, 
then shifting a true belief into the future by continuing to believe in it 
should not be. Think of the spatial analog. If I am in St. Louis and I 
                                                 
10 Richard (1981) p.4  
11 Nathan Salmon, ‘Tense and Singular Propositions,’ Themes from 
Kaplan (1989) p. 345 
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believe: “it is raining.” It would not make sense for me to move to the 
Mojave and continue to believe “it is raining.” Eternalism has a rough and 
ready answer for belief retention. The eternalist says that Mary believes 
that “Nixon is president at t” and thus she continues to believe only that 
proposition, whose truth-value is not changed by shifting the proposition 
into the future. This is a thumbnail sketch of the problem of belief 
retention.  
 According to Richard, the temporalist should assign the following 
truth conditions to the premises and conclusion of MARY:  
(MARYT)  
[1] ∃p∃t(t < t* & p = [Pn] & Bmpt)  
 [2] ∀p(∃t(t < t* & Bmpt) → Bmpt*)  
 [3] ∃p(p = [Pn] & Bmpt*)  
Here p ranges over propositions, ‘<’ means ‘is earlier than’, t* is the time 
of utterance, m is a constant that refers to Mary, and [Pn] is the temporal 
proposition that ‘Nixon is president’. On this reading of MARY, the first 
premise states that there is a time t such that t is earlier than the time of 
utterance t*, and a proposition p such that p is Nixon is president and at t 
Mary believes that p. The second premise states that for all propositions p, 
if there is a time t that is earlier than the time of utterance t* and Mary 
believes that p, then at the time of utterance t* Mary believes that p. 
Finally, the conclusion states that there is a proposition p such that p is 
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Nixon is president, and at the time of utterance t* Mary believes that p. On 
this temporalist reading, MARY is valid. So the temporalist is committed 
to the validity of an argument that intuitively appears invalid. I say 
intuitively because the following type of experiment can be done: have 
any non-temporalist philosopher read MARY and tell you whether they 
believe the conclusion is correct or not. In most cases ( in my experience) 
they will not think the conclusion is correct. It seems to have a prima facie 
invalidity.  
 While the temporalist must nevertheless maintain the validity of 
the conclusion in MARY, the eternalist, as Richard notes, ‘is not thus 
committed.’ On eternalism, the first premise of (MARY) is read as, there 
is a time t such that t is earlier than the time of utterance t*, and Mary 
believes at t that ‘Nixon is president at t. Taking this reading of [1] in 
conjunction with the second premise (same reading as MARYT), [3] 
simply does not follow.  
 Brogaard (2006) offers a helpful, illustrative variation on MARY. 
Consider this reasoning:  
(JOHN)  
 [1] Mary believes everything John has ever said.  
[2] John said he was hungry 
_______________________________________  
 [3] Mary believes that John is hungry  
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In this example, the conclusion is clearly invalid. However, on 
temporalism, [2]JOHN ought to be true iff there is some time t, such that t is 
earlier than the time of utterance t*, and at t John says he is hungry, so if 
Mary believes everything John has ever said it, it follows that she believes 
that John is hungry. On eternalism, on the other hand [2]JOHN ought to be 
true iff there is some time t, such that t is earlier than the time of utterance 
t* and at t John says he is hungry at t. As a result JOHN comes out clearly 
invalid on eternalism (because it does not follow from the fact that John 
says he is hungry at t, and the fact Mary believes what he says [that he is 
hungry at t], that she believes that John is presently hungry); in other 
words, the implicit time references postulated by eternalism render JOHN 
invalid.  
 Finally, Richard presents another variation on his argument against 
temporalism that we should also consider:  
 (IMARY)  
  [a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White  
                 House and I still believe that 
________________________________________________________  
 [b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the  
                  White House12  
                                                 
12 Richard, 1981 p.4  
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IMARY is intuitively invalid. As Richard points out, ‘it would be not only 
uncharitable but incorrect’ to infer [b] from [a]. According to Richard, 
however, the temporalist is committed to the validity of the inference in 
IMARY. Because, if temporalism is right, then [a] is true iff there is a time 
t such that t is earlier than the time of utterance t* and Mary believes at t 
that Nixon is up to no good in the White House, and at t* Mary still 
believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House. It follows, then, 
that at t* Mary believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House.  
 To put an edge on the foregoing discussion: we have seen that in 
each of these cases of attribution of belief retention temporalism leads us 
to the undesirable consequence of validating clearly invalid reasoning. 
According to Richard, this is ample reason to reject temporalism and 
accept eternalism as the correct view of unspecified temporal propositions.  
 Richard does consider two possible temporalist responses to his 
argument. The first of these would be an alternative account of belief 
retention on which we could not infer that Mary believes that Nixon is 
president from the facts that Mary believed Nixon was president and Mary 
retains all of her beliefs. On the second response, according to Richard, 
the temporalist could offer alternative truth conditions for attributions of 
belief. Let us suppose that the temporalist proffers an account of belief 
retention whereon ‘to retain a belief is not to continue to believe the very 
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same proposition. Rather, it is to believe a proposition related in some 
special way to the proposition originally believed’13 For instance, consider  
   (N) Nixon is president  
On the naïve view of belief retention (i.e. the pre-philosophical view) if 
Mary comes to believe that (N) at time t1, then Mary retains her belief that 
(N) at t2 just in case she believes the same proposition (N) at both t1 and t2. 
On the alternative view, Richard suggests, we might suppose there is a 
another proposition   
 (N2) Nixon was president  
Which is related to (N) such that (N2) obtains iff (N) obtains. The 
temporalist might plausibly argue that when we say Mary retains her 
belief that (N), we really mean that Mary now believes (N2). This 
maneuver blocks Richard’s argument because if Mary comes to believe 
(N2) she need not continue to believe (N) so the conclusion of MARY is 
no longer valid.  
  Richard objects to this move. Suppose that sometime in 2004 
Mary has a belief that can be expressed by  
  (C) The Saint Louis Cardinals will win the pennant in 2004 
Suppose that the Cardinals perform badly in the last few weeks of the 
season and Mary appropriately repudiates her previous belief that (C). We 
would not want to say, at the end of the season, that Mary has retained her 
                                                 
13 Richard, 1981 p.6  
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belief that (C). However, it could be the case that in 2003 Mary had a 
belief which was correctly expressed by (C). In this case, she could retain 
the (true) belief that (C) while giving up the (false) belief she expressed by 
(C) in 2004. However this does not work on the above account. For if the 
temporalist is right, then (C) expressed precisely the same proposition in 
2003 as it did in 2004. In which case, Mary believes C2003 iff she believes 
C2004. In other words Mary only retains her belief from 2003, iff she 
retains her belief from 2004, since they are they same belief. To clarify, 
we do want Mary’s retained belief from before the 2004 season to be the 
same as Mary’s belief during the 2004 season. They are clearly different 
beliefs. But on the theory on offer they are treated the same.  
 The second account of retention that Richard suggests for the 
temporalist is what I will call quasi-eternalism or qETERNALISM. On 
qETERNALISM if Mary believes at time t1 that (N) ‘Nixon is president’ is 
true, then she retains her belief at a later time t2 iff she believes ‘Nixon is 
president at t1’ at t2 . qETERNALISM clearly avoids Richard’s argument, 
but at a steep cost. First, it violates our intuitive notion that belief retention 
consists of a relation to one and only one object. In other words, when we 
conceive of ourselves as retaining a belief we usually see as ourselves as 
maintaining a relation to a particular object of belief. Thus if Nora retains 
her friendship with Jon, she does not do so by being a friend of Jon’s at a 
time t1 and then being a friend of Eric’s at a later time t2. Second, 
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qETERNALISM fails to tells us what it means to ‘retain’ a belief as 
opposed to simply believing two unrelated propositions at two different 
times (which seems to be the case on this view). Third, qETERNALISM 
fails according to Richard, because it is entirely ad hoc. As he puts it:  
  To explain the retention of belief, the temporalist appeals 
exclusively to eternal propositions. Why explain only belief retention by 
appeal to eternal propositions?; Why not simply say that whenever one has 
a belief, the object of one’s belief is eternal? If my retaining my belief, 
expressible yesterday by ‘Nixon is president’, consists in my believing 
that Nixon was president yesterday, why, one may reasonably wonder, 
isn’t the belief I expressed yesterday using ‘Nixon is president’ the belief 
that then (yesterday) Nixon was president.14 The qETERNALIST, then, 
treats the objects of all retained beliefs as eternal propositions. It is a short 
step from this to full blown eternalism. And the qETERNALIST offers us 
no reason to refrain from going this further step.  
4. Temporalist responses to Richard  
 Richard’s argument against temporalism has provoked quite a 
lively discussion on the subject. Before offering my own reply to Richard, 
it will be helpful to briefly sketch a few temporalist replies.  
  Recall from the last section the following argument: 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p. 9  
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 (MARY)  
  [1] Mary believed that Nixon was president  
 [2] Mary still believes everything she once believed  
  ______________________________________  
 [3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president MARY 
and similar arguments cause a problem for the temporalist because the 
temporalist takes Mary as believing the temporally unspecified proposition 
that ‘Nixon is president’ and if she retains this belief as [2] indicates then 
she must retain the belief that ‘Nixon is president’ which of course does 
not at all follow.  
 Mark Aronszajn15 suggests that temporalists should concede that 
there is a reading of MARY on which the argument comes out valid. And 
it is one of the more natural readings. Nevertheless, the terms of the 
premises contain ambiguities and as a result admit of more than one 
plausible reading. Aronszajn then suggests that on some of these alternate 
readings MARY correctly comes out invalid, even on temporalism. He 
argues, The fact is that sentence [1] is ambiguous, and the quantifier in 
sentence [2] admits an indexical treatment. These points raise the 
possibility that there is one inference – expressed on one interpretation, in 
contexts of one particular sort – which is the one we find intuitively 
invalid, and that there is some other inference – expressed on some other 
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interpretation, in contexts of some other sort – which temporalists are 
committed to saying is valid. If that were the case, there wouldn’t be (at 
least from that fact alone) any argument against temporalism.16  
  Sentence [1] is ambiguous, says Aronszajn, insofar as it can be 
read as saying both that (i) there is some time t such that t is in the past 
and it was the case that at t Mary believed ‘Nixon is president’ was true, 
and that (ii) there is some time t such that t is in the past and it was the 
case that at t Mary believed ‘Nixon was president.’ On the first reading the 
past tense of the embedded verb (was) in [1] is vacuous, and on the second 
the past tense of the embedded verb is anaphoric on the past tense of the 
attitude verb (believed). According to Aronszajn, if [1] is read as meaning 
that Mary believed at t that at some time prior to t Nixon was president, 
then MARY is invalid—even if temporalism is true. While [1] is more 
naturally given a reading according to which what Mary believed was that 
Nixon is president, Aronszajn thinks it is possible that we find MARY 
invalid because we tend to conflate the two readings  
 [2] also admits multiple readings insofar as it contains the 
quantifying phrase ‘everything she ever believed.’ This phrase can be read 
in at last two ways. On the first reading ‘everything’ quantifies over an 
unrestricted domain, as in ‘everything exists.’ On the second reading 
‘everything’ quantifies a restricted domain, as in ‘as soon as everyone is 
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here, we’ll start the meeting.’ Clearly in cases like the latter we do not 
assume the domain of the quantifier is unrestricted. We do not usually 
wait for the Pope to arrive before proceeding with the meeting. Aronszajn 
think it likely that in most cases we would read the quantifier as restricted. 
In this case, he suggests, it could be restricted to only eternal propositions. 
But, if the domain of the quantifier ‘everything’ is restricted to just eternal 
propositions, then MARY comes out invalid on both eternalism and 
temporalism (it bears mentioning, as we said above, that the temporalist 
has both eternal and temporal propositions available in his ontology).  
 Aronszajn also offers a reply to IMARY. Remember that that 
argument went:  
(IMARY)  
 [a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White  
                 House and I still believe that 
__________________________________________________________  
 [b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the  
                  White House  
The difficulty in IMARY is that the conjunct in the premise seems to say: 
I, Mary, still believe whatever I believed earlier. But on temporalism the 
proposition Mary believed earlier was the temporally unspecified 
proposition ‘Nixon is up to no good in the White House’. Thus if Mary 
still believes whatever she believed then she believes that ‘Nixon is up to 
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no good in the White House.’ But this does not seem to follow intuitively 
from the premise.  
 Aronszajn replies that the premise of the argument is ambiguous 
because there is more than one way to read the demonstrative ‘that’ at the 
end of the premise. On one reading ‘that’ just is a demonstrative which 
points to the belief of the earlier occasion. In this case, ‘I still believe that’ 
comes out to ‘I, Mary, still believe that Nixon is up to no good in the 
White House’. On this reading of ‘that’ the inference in IMARY comes 
out valid. So the temporalist is committed to the validity of IMARY. On 
an alternative reading however, ‘that’ is understood as a ‘pronoun of 
laziness,’ a term which stands in for a noun or phrase which proceeds it. 
For instance in the expression:  
  (S) Superman lifted the mountain. This was very taxing.  
In (S) ‘this’ is a pronoun of laziness standing in for ‘Superman lifted the 
mountain’. Aronszajn argues that if ‘that’ in IMARY is a pronoun of 
laziness like ‘this’, then ‘I, Mary still believe that’ should be read as 
elliptical, standing for ‘I Mary still believe that Nixon was up to no good 
in the White House.’ From this it certainly does not follow that Mary 
believes that Nixon is up to no good in the White House. Therefore on this 
alternative reading (which seems equally as plausible as the first) IMARY 
comes out invalid, and there is no harm here for the temporalist.  
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 Aronszajn suggests that when we are presented with arguments 
like IMARY, since the argument admits more than one plausible reading, 
we ought to be guided by the following pragmatic rule: (PR) If a belief 
ascription is ambiguous, pick an interpretation that is charitable regarding 
which belief it ascribes, given prevailing conceptions of normalcy in 
beliefs, and any other relevant information supplied either by the context 
or in the larger discourse in which the belief ascription occurs.17 In 
IMARY the premise entails the conclusion on one reading, but we are 
reluctant to attribute to Mary the belief that ‘Nixon is up to no good in the 
White House’ because this seemingly insults her intelligence. As 
Aronszajn puts it: [T]he semantics for [‘Mary believed that Nixon was up 
to no good in the White House’] entails that Mary believed the non-eternal 
proposition that [Nixon] is up to no good in the White House, and … in 
some contexts we could accept that this is the proposition [‘she still 
believes that’] says Mary believes. However, in the present context we 
hesitate to accept this. It would be quite abnormal today for someone to 
believe that [Nixon] is up to anything in the White House. So at present, 
we find inference [IMARY] questionable because we now find it 
uncharitable to attribute such a belief to Mary. [PR] requires that we seek 
another, more charitable interpretation of the first line of [IMARY]. And 
there is one: the lazy interpretation mentioned above. … But then we are 
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taking the sentence to express a proposition … from which the conclusion 
of [IMARY] does not follow. Hence we find the inference unacceptable.18 
The reason IMARY seems to be invalid is that we choose the lazy reading 
of the second conjunct for charitable reasons. In other words we take Mary 
as believing that ‘Nixon was up to no good in the White House’. But in 
other contexts we could equally as plausibly take the proposition Mary 
believed on the earlier occasion to be the proposition that ‘Nixon is up to 
no good in the White House.’  
 Aronszajn ends his defense of temporalism by presenting the 
following problem for eternalism, consider the argument:  
  (1992)    
 [c] In 1990, Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in the  
White House.  
 [d] In 1992, Mary still believed everything she believed back in  
                 1990. 
__________________________________________________________  
[e] Hence, in 1992, Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in  
     the White House.  
The inference in 1992 seems to be valid. However if eternalism is right, 
then the inference cannot be valid. For, in that case, the first premise is 
true iff in 1990 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in the White 
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House in 1990. And the second premise is true iff for any proposition p, if 
Mary believes p in 1990, then she believes p in 1992. And finally the 
conclusion is true iff in 1992 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in 
the White House in 1992. Eternalism, says Aronszajn, fails to get the right 
truth conditions for 1992. On eternalism the conclusion of 1992 ought to 
be read as ‘in 1992 Mary believes that Bush is up to no good in the White 
House in 1992,’ which clearly does not follow from [c] and [d]. Problem. 
Thus the tables are turned on the eternalist and the temporalist can 
formulate a Richardian argument against eternalism, that is, that we ought 
to reject eternalism given its commitment to the invalidity of an intuitively 
valid argument.  
 In response to Aronszajn, G.W. Fitch19 argues that, contrary to 
appearances, eternalism does make the right inferences in cases like 1992. 
In other words he thinks that 1992 is invalid, as he says it seems to me that 
the natural reading of [c] is that in 1990 Mary believed that Bush was up 
to no good in the White House in 1990; the natural reading of [d] is that by 
1992 Mary had not changed her beliefs with respect to what she believed 
in 1990 – in particular, in 1992 Mary still believed that Bush had been up 
to no good in the White House in 1990; and finally, the natural reading of 
[e] follows that of [c], namely that in 1992 Mary believed that Bush was 
up to no good in the White House in 1992. Given these readings of [c], [d] 
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and [e], it is easy to see that the inference fails, since nothing in the 
premises assures us that Mary believed that Bush was up to no good in 
1992.20 According to Fitch, our pre-theoretical intuitions cannot be used to 
settle the validity or invalidity of 1992, as Aronszajn supposes. Since it is 
possible to provide eternalist truth conditions for 1992, and temporalist 
truth conditions for the same, Fitch thinks it is self-serving for either side 
to claim that the pre-theoretical intuitions of ordinary language users 
favors their truth conditions, or their interpretation, over the other. Pace 
Fitch, I think it is a matter for empirical investigation which truth 
conditions are favored by the pre-theoretical intuitions of language users. 
It is not self serving for Aronszajn to claim that these intuitions favor his 
position. It may turn out to be empirically incorrect. But if it is correct, 
then Aronszajn has made a very strong case.  
 Moreover, Fitch offers the following case of dialogue as support 
for eternalism: (ARIZONA)  
 (Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)  
 Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona  
 (Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on August 1)  
 Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?  
 Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.  
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The problem here is that, on eternalism, the belief that Jon is ascribing to 
himself in August is the temporally unspecified belief ‘I am in Arizona.’ 
But, barring schizophrenia on Jon’s part, this is clearly not how we should 
take Jon’s response in this case. What Jon intends to say is that on July 1 
he was in Arizona, and at present he still believes that on July 1 he was in 
Arizona. Perhaps, some might think, the ‘it’ in ‘I still believe it’ is a 
‘pronoun of laziness’ and proxy for some other more felicitous 
proposition. Unfortunately this route is blocked, because if ‘it’ goes proxy 
at all, it is for the temporally unspecified proposition ‘I am in Arizona’ 
which is precisely the result we are taking pains to avoid. So it seems like 
cases such as ARIZONA pose further problems for the temporalist.  
 In her forthcoming work, Berit Brogaard argues for another 
version of temporalism which, she thinks, avoids both Richards arguments 
and the difficulties Fitch presents for accounts like Aronszajn’s. 
According to Brogaard, and here I concur, Aronszajn’s pragmatic account 
of the seeming invalidity of MARY and JOHN is considerably weaker 
than his pragmatic account of the seeming invalidity of IMARY. Brogaard 
thinks we must look elsewhere for a resolution of MARY and JOHN.  
 Returning to Richard’s arguments on behalf of the temporalist, 
Brogaard notes that on both of the strategies Richard suggests ‘to retain a 
belief is not to continue to believe the same proposition. Rather, it is to 
believe a proposition related in some special way to the proposition 
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originally believed.’ On the one strategy what one continues to believe 
when one retains a belief in a proposition is simply that proposition + a 
past tense operator, such that one’s belief that ‘Nixon is president’ when 
retained becomes the belief that ‘Nixon was president’ where ‘was’ is not 
vacuous, but indicates a tense. On the other strategy what one continues to 
believe is some temporally specified (i.e. eternal) proposition such that 
one’s belief that Nixon is president’ at t1 becomes the belief that ‘Nixon 
was president at t1.’ Both strategies fail, per Richard, because they fail to 
specify what belief retention consists of if not ‘maintaining a relation 
(belief) to a particular object (presumably) a proposition.’  
 Brogaard argues21 that while the second strategy is ad hoc, as 
Richard claims, the first strategy is simply insufficiently developed. As it 
stands, the first strategy leaves retained beliefs too unspecific. To correct 
this, Brogaard proposes that, primarily, to retain a belief is to maintain a 
belief relation to one and the same object over time. But one can also 
retain a belief secondarily by maintaining a belief relation to an object that 
is appropriately related to the original object. When one continues to 
believe that Nixon is president for four years, one maintains a belief 
relation to a particular object over time, namely the temporal proposition 
that Nixon is president. If Nixon is then impeached, one ceases believing 
that Nixon is president and forms a new belief, in this case, that Nixon was 
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president but isn’t anymore. Thus, when one continues to believe that p, 
one’s original belief that p is retained. But even when one continues to 
believe that Pp (where the semantic value of P is a tense operator such as 
‘it was the case that’) one’s original belief is essentially retained. On this 
view of belief retention  
 Some will argue, Brogaard continues, that the paraphrase of the 
second premise of MARY which her account of belief retention provides, 
namely, that Mary continues to believe that ‘it was the case that Nixon is 
president,’ is too liberal. On this charge there is no reason to think that that 
is what is meant by ‘Mary still believes everything she once believed.’ 
Brogaard has a response to this: we should employ something like 
Aronszajn’s rule (PR). In other words, strictly speaking, MARY comes 
out valid, but because when tend to think of belief retention in the terms 
Richard suggests (as a relation to only one object) we tend to offer a non-
literal interpretation of the second premise on which MARY comes out 
invalid.  
 This strategy also works, according to Brogaard, for cases like 
(ARIZONA)  
 (Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)  
 Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona  
 (Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on January 1)  
 Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?  
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 Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.  
In such cases, the belief that Jon retains on August 1 is not the temporally 
unspecific proposition ‘I am in Arizona’ but rather a related belief 
incorporating the appropriate tense operator, for instance: ‘I was in 
Arizona.’ As Brogaard points out, there is still issue of belief retention’s 
being a one-at-time relation to resolve. Her response is two-pronged. First 
she admits that on temporalism some beliefs are retained by continuing to 
believe a single (eternal) proposition over time, as in ‘I believe John 
Kennedy was assassinated at 12:30 CST November 22, 1963.’ Second, 
temporalism leaves open the possibility that we can also retain our belief 
in unspecified temporal propositions such as ‘Nixon is president,’ by 
maintaining a belief relation to an appropriately related belief such as 
‘Nixon was president.’ Eternalists are unable to allow this second strain of 
belief retention. On eternalism, to continue to believe that ‘Nixon is 
president’ is to have potentially infinitely many atomic beliefs, as we saw 
in the introduction (above)  
   At t1… (E1) Nixon is president at t1  
At t2… (E2) Nixon is president at t2  
At t3… (E3) Nixon is president at t3  
At t4… (E4) Nixon is president at t4  
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On an atomic conception of time, retaining the belief ‘Nixon is president’ 
means believing it at every atomic instant of time. Brogaard takes this 
account of retention as problematic for the eternalist.  
 Brogaard also considers an argument against temporalism from 
Evans (1985: 349-50) which turns on the ‘Incompleteness Hypothesis’  
  
Incompleteness Hypothesis  
A tensed sentence that does not make explicit or implicit reference to a 
time is not truth evaluable 
 
 this hypothesis traces back to the argument made by Frege about 
sentences such as “the tree is green”. The argument from incompleteness 
runs as follows. It is a necessary truth about instantiated properties that 
they must be instantiated at some particular time. Borrowing Brogaard’s 
example: if John is a firefighter, then he must be a firefighter at some time. 
Thus, no complete proposition can be expressed by ‘John is a firefighter’ 
until some time is appended to the sentence. Brogaard points out that there 
is an analogy between “John is a firefighter” and other sentences like 
“Jane is ready.” The latter does not express a complete proposition until 
some act is supplied. It cannot be evaluated for truth until we are told what 
Jane is supposed to be ready for. Brogaard argues that the reasoning 
 Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 35 
  
behind arguments from the Incompleteness is ‘highly suspect’. Following 
Cappelen and Lepore22 (forthcoming) that  
“[F]rom the fact that a given event or state-of-affairs requires for 
its existence a particular property, it does not follow that the 
property is a constituent of a proposition concerning it. For 
example, from the fact that a driving occurs at a certain speed, we 
should not want to conclude that the proposition expressed by 
‘John drove to Chicago last night’ contains a certain speed. And 
from the fact that a typewriting occurs at a certain pace, we should 
not want to conclude that the proposition expressed by ‘Nora is 
typing a letter’ contains a particular pace. Likewise, from the fact 
that John cannot instantiate the property of being a firefighter 
without instantiating it at some time, we should not want to 
conclude that there is a time in the proposition expressed by ‘John 
is a firefighter’.”23 
 However, I think the reasoning behind the argument from the 
Incompleteness Hypothesis may be stronger than Brogaard supposes. In 
particular, I think that the analogy between the cases of velocity and 
pacing and temporality does not go through. It is true that the proposition 
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propositions such as ‘it is raining’ contain specific references to locations. 
Brogaard applies their reasoning mutatis mutandis to question of implicit 
times.  
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‘John drove home’ need not contain velocity, and that the proposition 
Nora is typing need not contain a particular pace. But it does not follow 
from this that ‘John is a firefighter’ need not contain some particular time 
(or times). I contend that ‘being x’ is a special class of property that 
requires a specific time indication to be evaluated for truth whenever it is 
instantiated. In Brogaard’s cases John is not being driving home, nor is 
Nora being typing a letter, but John is being a firefighter, and as such the 
proposition ‘John is a firefighter’ must contain a time. As I see it, the 
difference between the former and latter cases is that there is no intrinsic 
velocity to the act of driving and no intrinsic pace to the act of typing, but 
there is intrinsic temporality to being. If a thing exists, it must have (at 
least instantaneous) temporal extension. So, I think, Brogaard’s 
counterexamples can be resolved.  
 To sum up then, Aronszajn suggests that Richard’s argument from 
belief retention hangs on ambiguous examples, whose conclusions can, he 
admits, be read as problematic for temporalism. Yet on other plausible 
readings they come out invalid even for temporalism. He then suggests 
that when faced with such examples we err on the side of charity, offering 
the reading which least insults the intelligence of the subject in the 
question. He then offers a counter argument, 1992, which he thinks shows 
a shortcoming in eternalism. Fitch responds to Aronszajn’s counter 
arguments by saying that he errs in allowing his pre-theoretical intuitions 
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to guide his view of the plausibility of alternate readings of MARY and 
IMARY. He then offers his own counter-argument to Aronszajn, the 
Arizona case. Into this discussion, Brogaard adds that Richard has 
dismissed too quickly the possibility that belief retention could be stated in 
terms of a relation to an adequately related propositions. Instead of always 
being a relation to one and the same belief over time. She then goes on to 
propose something like Aronszajn’s pragmatic rule: in this case when the 
one-at-time view of retention makes a reading come out clearly invalid, 
we should charitably suppose that the second sort of retention (retention of 
an adequately related belief) is entailed. Finally she raises the argument 
from the Incompleteness Hypothesis, and suggests that Cappelen and 
Lepore’s strategy for answering similar cases regarding spatial locations 
can be applied in the temporal case to overcome this objection.  
 
6. My Solution  
That is the more or less where the debate stands at the moment. I 
now turn to my own reply to Richard. My response to Richard’s argument 
begins by unpacking a particular theory about propositions. Propositions 
are, as I said at the outset, generally understood as the (abstract) shareable 
objects of belief, meanings of sentences, and vehicles of truth-values. We 
have already seen that temporalists add minimally to this definition. In 
particular they add that some propositions are eternal (containing implicit 
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time-references) and others are temporal (temporally unspecified). (It 
bears noting that this addition is not nominal—it postulates a genuine 
difference between eternal and temporal propositions—the temporalists 
are making an ontological claim). I now wish to add even more to that 
definition. Thus, I suggest that the eternalist should take the following 
view of propositions. I agree with Frege, and Richard, that all propositions 
are eternal propositions. However, I am quite sympathetic to the 
temporalist intuition that not all propositions seem temporally specified. 
Certainly from a pretheoretical standpoint, it seems like we often express 
temporally unspecified propositions. One way to bridge the competing 
views, is to offer an eternalist account which posits temporally unspecified 
propositions.  
My own view, which I will call durationalism, attempts to provide 
an eternalist framework for temporal propositions. Traditional eternalism 
is a single-denomination view of propositions. This brand of eternalism 
takes all propositions to be eternal (temporally specified) propositions, and 
chalks up any seemingly unspecified propositions to loose talk, or 
incomplete expressions. Traditional temporalism is a multiple-
denomination view. Temporalism says there are both eternal and temporal 
propositions. 
On the view I am suggesting we should depart from the traditional 
single-denomination eternalist accounts, which hold that there are no 
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temporal propositions at all, and opt instead for a multiple- denomination 
account, which attempts to account for temporal propositions 
eternalistically. On the view I am offering, a temporal proposition will not 
contain a time, but rather a set of times at which properties are distributed 
across temporal objects. On this view, which I call ‘durationalism’ it is not 
the temporal proposition per se that contains a time, rather it is the 
metaphysical constituents of the proposition (the objects and their 
properties), which are temporal, so that while the temporalist is correct to 
say the proposition itself contains no reference to a time, the presence of 
temporally located objects and properties in the proposition imports a time 
or times (i.e., a duration) to the expression of the proposition.    
 Fregean incompleteness arguments attempt to eliminate temporal 
propositions by arguing that they are simply cases of incomplete 
expression of standard eternal propositions. So that:  
  (3) Nora is sleeping  
is simply an incomplete expression of some eternal proposition like  
  (3`) Nora is sleeping at t  
where t is a time indexical (e.g. 4:30 am CST July 4, 2006). My goal is to 
incorporate temporal propositions into eternalism without necessarily 
appending a time indexical to them. I do so by arguing that we treat the 
object of (3) (Nora) with metaphysical seriousness; that is we treat Nora as 
a concretely existing object of an abstract proposition. As a concrete 
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object, Nora exists at a time. My argument for this is a temporalized 
version of Kant’s argument for pure space. In other words for any object 
we can imagine we cannot separate that object from its temporal location 
any more than we can separate it from its spatial location. We cannot 
imagine an apple, for example, without imagining the (apple-shaped) 
space the apple occupies. Likewise we cannot imagine Nora separately 
from the (Nora shaped)24 time she occupies.  
 Now someone might object that even if we cannot imagine Nora 
existing separate from time simplicter, we can nevertheless imagine Nora 
existing separately from any particular time. This presents a problem for 
my view. I am arguing that all propositions about Nora refer to a Nora 
shaped time, but it seems like that is not enough to fix the temporal 
reference that my theory needs. It might be the case that there are many 
possibly Nora shaped times which are unrelated to each other (e.g. as in 
the case of Nora time- travelling). I have argued that “Nora” picks out a 
concrete object and in so doing imports the time(s) at which that object 
exists into the proposition. If there is no specific time(s) the concrete 
object picks out, then there is no information imparted, and thus the 
proposition is simply incomplete (as in standard eternalism). Both 
                                                 
24 The idea of a Nora shaped time will be natural to eternalists of a 
different stripe, namely “worm theory” four dimensionalists such as 
Balashov. While I do not intend to endorse any particular temporal theory 
here, I admit that durationalism will comport better with “worm” 
perdurantism than “stage” perdurantism and may be incommensurate with 
endurantism.  
 Taylor, Adam P., 2006, UMSL, p. 41 
  
eternalists and temporalists will agree that in order for (3) to be truth 
evaluable, “Nora” needs to pick out an object (and in this case a concrete 
object). If it does not then (3) expresses no proposition at all. On the other 
hand if “Nora” does pick out a concrete object then that object will have a 
fixed temporal location, defined as either a single temporal coordinate—
for instantaneous objects (if there are such)— or a series of contiguous 
temporal coordinates for objects of a particular duration. It is my 
contention that all propositions contain at least a duration of times, if not a 
precise temporal coordinate. 
 In claiming this, I essentially argue that temporalism is wrong 
about the nature of temporal propositions (specifically insomuch as it says 
they do not contain implicit times). However, I also argue that traditional 
eternalism (as exemplified by Frege and Richard) is imprecise. It is not the 
case that every proposition must contain a particular time. I contend that 
some propositions contain a time, while others contain a duration (or a 
group or set of contiguous times).  
My view is therefore in opposition to both temporalism and 
traditional eternalism, though it could be viewed as eternalism of another 
stripe.  
To clarify a bit, I propose that standard eternal propositions (of the 
form: x is y at t) should be regarded as attributing properties to their 
objects atomically, while temporal propositions should be regarded as 
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attributing properties to their objects durationally. For example when I say 
‘John Kennedy is president at 12:34 CST June 5, 1962’ the property (is 
president) is distributed to the object of this proposition (John Kennedy) 
atomically (at 12:34 CST June 5 1962.) However, when I say ‘John 
Kennedy is president,’ the property (is president) is distributed to the 
object of the proposition (John Kennedy) durationally. The upshot to this 
view is that durational properties do not have to be distributed uniformly 
across their object in order for the object to posses that property. For 
instance, if I put one end of a poker in the fireplace, the poker will get 
glowing hot at one end, but be cool enough for me to pick up at the other 
end. And even so we will refer to the poker as a ‘hot poker.’ Another 
example, suppose if I say to my friend ‘this apple is very red’ It would be 
wrong, most would agree, to infer from this that the property ‘is red’ is 
uniformly distributed throughout the apple. After all if I bite into the apple 
I will find that most of the interior is white and some of the seeds are 
black. Likewise in the proposition:  
   (N) Nixon is president  
the property ‘is president’ is distributed durationally over the object 
Nixon. Thus it will not always be the case that (N) comes out true. At 
some times Nixon will be president and at others Nixon will not be 
president, just as in some places the apple will be red or the poker will be 
hot but not in every place.  
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 [1] Mary believed that Nixon was president  
 [2] Mary still believes everything she once believed  
   ______________________________________  
  [3] Therefore, Mary still believes that Nixon is president  
 
In the case of MARY, the durationalist has a reply. On durationalism 
MARY comes out valid iff the property ‘is president’ is uniformly 
distributed over Nixon at all times at which Nixon exists. If it is not so 
distributed, then MARY comes out invalid. Because there will be times at 
which Nixon is president and other times at which he is not president. It 
would be an insult to Mary, and to anyone who understands the meaning 
of ‘Nixon’ or ‘is president’ to suppose that they would take ‘is president’ 
to apply uniformly to the object ‘Nixon’. After all, presidents serve limited 
terms. So it will not always be the case that Nixon is president is true. It 
will be true at some times, but false at others, just as it will be true in some 
places that the apple is red while it will be false at others.  
Notice, however, that the durationalist does not need the embedded 
proposition ‘Nixon was president’ to comtaim a particular time in order to 
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determine that the conclusion in MARY is invalid. The determination 
simply follows from conjunction of the nature of the object of the 
proposition and the nature of property distributed by the proposition. In 
this case, on durationalism, there will not be enough information in [1] and 
[2] to elicit the conclusion [3]. Consider the similar case  
(PMARY)  
 [1] Mary believed that the poker was hot    
 [2] Mary still believes everything she once believed  
   ______________________________________  
  [3] Therefore, Mary still believes that poker is hot  
the conclusion of PMARY does not follow because the property ‘is hot’ is 
not necessarily uniformly distributed across the object of the proposition. 
At some times the poker will be hot, at other times it will not be.  
 As for Richard’s second case 
(IMARY)  
  [a] I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good in the White  
                  House and I still believe that 
_____________________________________________________  
  [b] Therefore, I, Mary, believe that Nixon is up to no good in the  
                   White House  
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here the durationalist has an equally simple reply. On durationalism, 
IMARY comes out valid iff the property (is up to no good in the White 
House) being ascribed to the object (Nixon) is uniformly distributed. 
Certainly no one would think that this is the case. Nixon could not, for 
instance, have been up to no good in the White House while he slept, or 
when he was 12 years old, etc. Since the property is not uniformly 
distributed, IMARY cannot possibly come out valid. Thus durationalism 
avoids this problem as well.  
  Richard raised another concern, though, that temporalism required 
us either to commit to qETERNALISM, or else to argue that belief 
retention could plausibly be seen as maintaining a relation not to one 
belief at a time, but to a belief which is adequately related to the original 
belief (as was Brogaard’s strategy). Durationalism avoids qETERNALSM 
insofar as the durationalist argues that when one retains her belief in a 
temporal proposition no time-reference is thereby supplemented. 
Durationalism also differs somewhat from the Richard/Brogaard position 
(which I will call standard relationalism), though it can be seen as another 
form of relationalism.  
Recall that Brogaard thinks that when we retain our belief that 
‘Nixon is president’ it is plausible that we do so by maintaining a belief 
relation not to this one proposition, but to another adequately related 
proposition such as ‘Nixon was president.’ On the durationalist view, 
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when we retain our belief that ‘Nixon is president’ we do so by 
maintaining a belief relation not to this same proposition but another 
proposition such as ‘Nixon was once president’ or ‘Nixon was sometime 
president.’  
 Finally, consider Fitch’s case: 
 (ARIZONA)  
 (Eric and Jon are on the phone on July 1)  
 Eric: Where are you? Jon: I am in Arizona  
 (Eric and Jon are at an APA meeting in New York on January 1)  
 Eric: Did you believe what you said on July 1?  
 Jon: Yes, and I still believe it.  
How does durationalism reply to this case? Clearly, the property ‘in 
Arizona’ is not intended to be distributed uniformly across Jon. Suppose 
someone calls me while I am in the tub, and I tell them I am in the tub. 
Clearly I do not mean that all of me is in the tub, some of me is clearly 
above the tub and outside the tub. Likewise here, the property (in Arizona) 
of the temporal proposition (I am in Arizona) is true of the object only at 
certain times. On durationalism, ‘I am in Arizona’ it is retained will come 
out as ‘I am sometimes in Arizona’ or ‘I was once in Arizona.’ So the 
durationalist avoids the Fitch’s problem as well.  
 I think the durationalist view has some intuitive appeal. It seems 
right to me that property attributions often generalize over objects. In 
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loose talk, we frequently attribute properties uniformly where we do not 
really mean to. Since temporal propositions make no specific references to 
times, it seems intuitively right that when we employ them, we do not 
intend the attributions they make to be applied uniformly at all times at 
which the object exists. Furthermore, on the durationalist view we get the 
right results to Richard and Fitch’s problem cases.  
 So I propose that the eternalist adopt this, or a suitably related, 
multiple-denomination view of propositions. Some propositions will 
contain explicit or implicit time references, others will refer durationally 
(i.e., they will not directly refer to a time at all, but rather to a set of times 
(i.e. a duration) at which properties which are distributed across temporal 
objects) insofar as they contain constituent objects which are intrinsically 
temporal.  
   
